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Abstract
We outline an intuitionistic view of knowledge which maintains the original Brou-
wer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionism and is consistent with the well-
known approach that intuitionistic knowledge be regarded as the result of verification.
We argue that on this view co-reflection A→ KA is valid and the factivity of knowl-
edge holds in the form KA→ ¬¬A ‘known propositions cannot be false’.
We show that the traditional form of factivity KA → A is a distinctly classical
principle which, like tertium non datur A ∨ ¬A, does not hold intuitionistically, but,
along with the whole of classical epistemic logic, is intuitionistically valid in its double
negation form ¬¬(KA→ A).
Within the intuitionistic epistemic framework the knowability paradox is resolved
in a constructive manner. We argue that this paradox is the result of an unwarranted
classical reading of constructive principles and as such does not have the consequences
for constructive foundations traditionally attributed it.
1 Introduction
Our goal is to lay the formal foundation for the study of knowledge from an intuitionistic
point of view. The resulting notions of knowledge and belief, hence, should be faithful
to the intended semantics of intuitionistic logic: the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov (BHK)
semantics. This well-established view regards belief and knowledge as the product of
verification.
While the standard domain of our theory is the same as that of BHK – mathematical
statements, proofs and verifications – we aim to show that BHK and the resulting intu-
tionistic systems of epistemic logic, IEL− and IEL, yield principles of constructive epistemic
reasoning which apply in more general settings. This framework also offers a natural resolu-
tion of the Church-Fitch knowability paradox, and suggests a more accommodating formal
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basis for an intuitionistically inspired philosophical verificationism than plain intuitionistic
logic.
Intuitionistic belief and knowledge behave quite differently from their classical coun-
terparts, and while comparisons are helpful and apposite it must be kept in mind that
assumptions and distinctions which make sense classically may not intuitionistically, or
take a different form.
The fundamental difference between intuitionistic and classical knowledge lies in their
relationship to their respective notions of truth.
According to the BHK semantics an intuitionistic proposition is true if proved. Since
intuitionistic belief and knowledge is the product of verification, the intuitionistic truth of a
proposition is sufficient for both belief and knowledge because intuitionistic truth contains
proof and every proof is also a verification:
Intuitionistic Truth ⇒ Intuitionistic Knowledge.
This insight is fundamental to the nature of intuitionistic reasoning about epistemic propo-
sitional attitudes, and how it differs from classical epistemic reasoning. Intuitionistically
the principle of the constructivity of truth, a.k.a co-reflection (K is the knowledge modality)
A→ KA (co-reflection)
is a truism about both belief and knowledge – for the aforementioned reason that all proofs
are verifications. Classically, of course, it is invalid because it asserts a form of omniscience,
that all classical truths are classically known.
What about the truth condition on knowledge, ‘known propositions are true’, in the in-
tuitionistic setting? Classically, this yields the factivity of knowledge which has the logical
form of the reflection principle KA → A. However, in the intuitionistic setting, reflec-
tion is too strong, to the extent of being invalid. The verification-based approach allows
that justifications more general than proof can be adequate for belief and knowledge, e.g.
verification by trusted means which do not necessarily produce explicit proofs of what is
verified. According to this view, the reflection principle for intuitionistic knowledge is not
universally valid: it is possible to have a provably verified proposition A without possessing
a specific proof of A itself (cf. section 2.3.2).
On the other hand, the truth condition for knowledge in the form ‘known propositions
cannot be false’ is intuitionistically valid and produces the principle
KA→ ¬¬A. (intuitionistic reflection)
Indeed, if KA then it is verified that A has a proof, not necessarily specified in the process
of verification; from this we conclude that it is not possible to produce a proof that A cannot
have a proof, hence ¬¬A. Naturally, in the classical framework, reflection and intuitionistic
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reflection are equivalent, and adopting the former instead of the latter is harmless, but not
in the intuitionistic setting.1
One should not expect all classical logical laws to stay valid intuitionistically. Many
classical principles cannot be transplanted into the intuitionistic domain as they are, e.g.
A∨¬A, ¬¬A→ A, ((A→ B)→ A)→ A, etc. These are all classical tautologies, not valid
intuitionistically without natural adjustments that provide them with appropriate construc-
tive meaning. There are many ways to make these formulas intuitionistically acceptable
without changing their classical reading, e.g., by Glivenko’s Theorem, [44]:
CPC ⊢ A ⇔ IPC ⊢ ¬¬A
(here CPC denotes classical propositional logic and IPC – intuitionistic propositional logic,
cf. [21]). This means that for each classical tautology A, the formula ¬¬A is a valid
intuitionistic principle.2 It turns out that the reflection of classical knowledge KA → A
is from the same cohort: it is valid classically, while not valid intuitionistically, but its
double negation translation ¬¬(KA → A) is intuitionistically valid and may be adopted
as an intuitionistic form of reflection for knowledge. In IEL we have opted for its equivalent
version KA → ¬¬A, which has an even more vivid factivity reading. In this respect
intuitionistic reflection can be read as claiming that intuitionistic knowledge yields truth
but without an explicit proof of that truth. Therefore, what classical factivity expresses is
preserved by intuitionistic reflection.
So, intuitionistic knowledge of A is positioned strictly in between A and ¬¬A:
A→ KA→ ¬¬A
which provides a basis for a more refined analysis of constructive truth than plain intuition-
istic logic. If we assume that the double negation translation is a meaningful intuitionistic
representation of classical truth, these findings can be presented as
Intuitionistic Truth ⇒ Intuitionistic Knowledge ⇒ Classical Truth.
1.1 Logics of Intuitionistic Belief and Knowledge
Extending the BHK semantics with the notion of verification, and conceiving of intuition-
istic belief and knowledge as a result of it, yields intuitionistic systems of epistemic logic,
IEL−, IEL. The key property of these systems, and hence of intuitionistic belief and knowl-
1The double negation translation ([14, 19, 21, 26, 44, 51, 58]) which, for atomic A is ¬¬A, is a canonical
way to approximate the classical truth of A intuitionistically. Whereas the BHK requirement for the
intuitionistic truth of A is to have a proof of A, the formula ¬¬A can be intuitionistically true without an
explicit proof of A; truth in this sense may be regarded as some form of classical truth.
2Another canonical way of embedding classical logic principles into the intuitionistic domain is Kol-
mogorov’s [58] double negation translation “¬¬ each subformula”.
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edge, in contrast to the classical, is that they all validate co-reflection, and can distinguish
between different strengths of reflection, or the truth condition.3
We begin with a general discussion of intuitionistic, verification-based, belief and knowl-
edge, and the principles which distinguish them from each other and from their classical
counterparts (section 2). The intuitionistic validity of co-reflection for belief and knowledge
changes the situation dramatically, and intuitionistic knowledge is not distinguishable from
belief in the same way as classical knowledge from classical belief.
The basic intuitionistic logic of belief IEL− is given by the epistemic closure prin-
ciple
K(A→ B)→ (KA→ KB)
along with the adoption of co-reflection
A→ KA,
which states that intuitionistic beliefs respect BHK-proofs: if A is constructively true, i.e.
has a specific proof, then the agent knows/believes that A. In IEL−, theoretically, false
beliefs are not a priori ruled out.
As mentioned above, the intuitionistic truth condition on knowledge, i.e. intuitionis-
tic factivity, ‘known propositions cannot be false’ admits a formalization as intuitionistic
reflection
KA→ ¬¬A.
Adding intuitionistic reflection to IEL− leads to the system IEL, which is the logic of
intuitionistic knowledge. We will see that in the intuitionistic context, in the presence of
co-reflection, intuitionistic reflection as well as other natural alternatives of the intuitionistic
truth condition are equivalent to provable consistency ¬K⊥ (section 2.3.3, appendix B)
therefore, IEL, is both the logic of intuitionistic knowledge and the logic of provably
consistent intuitionistic beliefs.
We prove soundness and completeness of IEL− and IEL with respect to appropriate
classes of self-explanatory Kripke-style models and derive some notable epistemic principles
(section 4, appendix A).
We also address the knowability paradox and intuitionistic responses to it (section
5). Our framework yields a well-founded constructive resolution which shows that the
knowability paradox is the product of an unwarranted classical reading of constructive
principles and does not have the consequences for constructive foundations traditionally
attributed it.
Finally, we address intuitionistic counter-arguments to co-reflection, and to the very
idea of intuitionistic knowledge arising from criticism of intuitionistic responses to the
knowability paradox. We argue that none of these arguments are well-founded because
their view of intuitionistic knowledge is not intuitionistic enough (section 6).
3 Though all are compatible with reflection, endorsing reflection in an intuitionistic setting would
represent a restrictive proof-based view of knowledge and trivialize the resulting epistemic logic system.
See the end of section 2.
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2 The Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov Semantics and
Knowledge
The Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionistic logic (cf. [21]) holds that a
proposition, A, is true if there is a proof of it, and false if we can show that the assumption
that there is a proof of A leads to a contradiction. Truth for the logical connectives is
defined by the following clauses:
• a proof of A ∧ B consists in a proof of A and a proof of B;
• a proof of A ∨ B consists in giving either a proof of A or a proof of B;
• a proof of A→ B consists in a construction which given a proof of A returns a proof
of B;
• ¬A is an abbreviation for A→ ⊥, and ⊥ is a proposition that has no proof.
Our question is: if we add an epistemic operator K to our language, what should be
the intended semantics of a proposition of the form KA?
We adopt the view that an intuitionistic epistemic state (belief or knowledge)
is the result of verification, where a verification is evidence considered sufficiently con-
clusive for practical purposes.4 The idea that verifications are not necessarily proofs is
common in the verificationist literature, see the citations in note 4. In a formal setting
Williamson incorporates non-proof verifications in his system, [95]; see also note 12.
2.1 The BHK Clause for the Knowledge Modality
Before we introduce a K-clause, we assume that the conception of proof has two salient
features: (1) proofs are conclusive of the proposition they establish and hence are (the
purest form of) verifications; (2) proofs are checkable – that something is a proof is itself
capable of proof.
We propose the following epistemic BHK clause governing the knowledge operator K:
• a proof of KA is conclusive evidence of verification that A has a proof.
Such a verification, of course, need not deliver a proof of A itself. For example, consider
propositions from the point of view of Intuitionistic Type Theory, ITT. Propositions are
special types whose elements are proofs (or evidence or witnesses), that is each inhabitant
4 Verifications, hence, are not necessarily generalizations of the notion of ‘canonical proof’ found in
philosophical verificationism, see e.g. [18, 22, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 66, 71, 75, 77, 78, 85, 86, 88, 90]. A
verification does not have to be canonical or even a means for acquiring a canonical verification, consider
the examples in section 2.3.2. For a similar reading of K in a more formal setting see Williamson’s
proposal for an intuitionistic epistemic logic [95], see section 6.2.1. See [97] for some discussion of the
nature of verification and its relation to a generalised intuitionism.
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of the proposition type may be considered to be a proof of the proposition. For each type A
one can form a ‘truncated type’ inh(A),5 see [91] (also called ‘squash types’, ‘monotypes’ or
‘bracket types’, see [17, 59]), which contains no information beyond the fact that the type
A is inhabited. Where the inhabitants of the proposition type A are proofs of A, which
each convey some specific information, inh(A) “forgets” all such information other than the
existence of these inhabitants. A truncated type can have at most one inhabitant which
serves only to indicate either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ depending on whether A is indeed inhabited.
A truncated proposition of type inh(A), hence, conveys only the information that A has
a proof, but does not deliver any such proof of A. We can interpret KA as just such a
truncated type inh(A).
Even in this verbal form, theK-clause suffices for some epistemic analysis. For example,
we can check that K(A ∨ B) does not necessarily yield that KA holds or that KB holds
K(A ∨B) 6→ KA ∨KB;
Indeed, K(A ∨ B) states that there is a proof of disjunction A ∨ B, but does not actually
produce such a proof, or even a means for constructing such a proof, so we cannot decide
which of KA and KB holds, this is confirmed by Theorem 10 below.
2.2 The BHK Meaning of Knowledge Assertions
By the BHK clause above KA is read as it is verified that A holds intuitionistically, i.e.
that A has a proof, not necessarily specified in the process of verification. However, the
intuitionistic epistemic logic we construct, section 3, also captures a reading:
it is verified that A holds in some not specified constructive sense.6 (*)
The language of intuitionistic logic is not sensitive enough to distinguish these readings.
We regard the first reading as our ‘official’ one, and leave exploration of the second to later
investigations.7
A question to consider is whether a proposition is intuitionistically true only if an agent
is aware of a proof or whether the possibility of such awareness is enough? Traditionally,
intuitionism assumes that proofs are available to the agent. For Brouwer and Heyting proofs
are mental constructions,8 and so the existence of a proof requires its actual construction.
This position is the one traditionally adopted by verificationists, see e.g. [29, 31, 34]. On
5or ||A||.
6I.e. is not necessarily a BHK-compliant proof, but constructive in a more general sense, see the examples
of highly probable truth, and empirical knowledge in section 2.3.2 below. The examples of zero-knowledge
protocols, testimony of an authority, existential generalization, and classified sources can be read as exam-
ples of the first reading.
7For instance a bi-modal classical language can distinguish and capture these readings, see section 3.3.
8Brouwer [12, p.4] considered intuitionistic mathematics to be “an essentially languageless activity of
the mind”. Heyting [51, p.2] says “In the study of mental mathematical constructions ‘to exist’ must be
synonymous with ‘to be constructed’”. See also [49, 50].
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the other hand Prawitz [71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76] and Martin-Lo¨f [64, 65, 66], consider proofs
to be timeless entities, and that intuitionistic truth consists in the existence of such proofs,
and their potential to be constructed.
The principles of intuitionistic knowledge and belief we discuss below are compatible
with either of these positions. Hence, if BHK proofs are assumed to be available to the agent,
thenKA can be read as ‘A is believed’ or ‘A is known’, depending on the assumptions made
about the epistemic state. If proofs are platonic entities, not necessarily available to the
knower, thenKA is read as ‘A can be believed (or known) under appropriate conditions’. To
keep things simple, in our exposition we follow the former, more traditional, understanding.
So to claimKA is true is to claim that the agent is aware of a proof that it has been verified
that A has a proof.
Co-reflection does not hold for the combination of the above two positions where proofs
are timeless platonic entities while knowledge requires actual awareness; the existence of a
proof does not guarantee an agent is aware of it. This combination rather validates a form
of knowability, if a proposition has a proof then it is possible to know it, i.e.
A→ ✸KA
(see section 5 for discussion of this and other possible formalizations of the knowability
principle).
2.3 Principles of Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic
Co-reflection and reflection play a special role in intuitionistic epistemology. Co-reflection is
the defining principle of intuitionistic epistemic states, it holds for any shade of intuitionistic
belief or knowledge. Reflection, on the other hand, holds only for epistemic states with
degenerated knowledge at which ‘A is known’ is equivalent to ‘A’ itself. This, of course, is
very different from the classical case where reflection is the defining principle of knowledge
and co-reflection holds only for omniscient epistemic states.
These facts follow from the assumption that intuitionistic belief and knowledge is the
result of verification, and the fact that intuitionistic truth is based on proof. Given this,
reflection and co-reflection may be seen as expressing two informal principles about the
relationship between truth and verification-based knowledge:
1. proof yields verification-based knowledge (co-reflection);
2. verification-based knowledge yields proof (reflection).
A BHK-compliant epistemology accepts 1 and rejects 2.
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2.3.1 Proof Yields Belief and Knowledge
The principle that proof yields verification is practically constitutive of proof,9 precisely
because proofs are a special and most strict kind of verification, and immediately
justifies the validity of the formal principle of co-reflection
A→ KA.
That proofs are taken to be verifications is a matter of the ordinary usage of the term
which understands a proof as “an argument that establishes the validity of a proposition”
[1]. It is also a fairly universal view in mathematics (cf. [13, 82, 87]). Within computer
science this concept is the cornerstone of a big and vibrant area in which one of the key
purposes of computer-aided proofs is for the verification of the propositions in question
[16, 17]. Amongst intuitionists the idea of a constructive proof is often treated as simply
synonymous with verification [28, 32, 55]. Hence co-reflection should be read as expressing
the constructive nature of intuitionistic truth, which itself being a strict verification yields
verification-based belief or knowledge.
According to the BHK reading of intuitionistic implication co-reflection states that
given a proof of A one can always construct a proof of KA. Is such a construction
always possible? Indeed, it is well established that proof-checking is a valid operation on
proofs,10 so if x is a proof of A then it can be proof-checked and hence produce a proof
p(x) of ‘x is a proof of A’. Having checked a proof we have a proof that the proposition is
proved, hence verified, hence known or believed. In whatever sense we consider a proof to
be possible, or to exist, co-reflection states that the proof-checking of this proof is always
possible, or exists, in the same sense. So, by the principle that proof yields verification we
have that a proof of A yields knowledge or belief of A, and by proof-checking we obtain a
proof of KA.
On the type-theoretic reading of KA co-reflection is immediate; given a specific in-
habitant of the proposition A it is guaranteed that the type is inhabited, hence inh(A)
holds.
We are not, of course, the first to outline arguments that an intuitionistic conception
of truth supports co-reflection, see for instance [24, 46, 57, 67, 69, 70, 93, 94, 98].11 Our
contention is that co-reflection, when properly understood in line with the intended BHK
semantics, is a fairly immediate consequence of uncontroversially intuitionistic views about
9Though not common in mainstream epistemology there are, or have been, mathematical skeptics.
Perhaps the best known mathematical skeptical argument is the one Descartes puts forward in [25], see
also [38, 39, 40]. See also [41] and [56] who both discuss the skeptical consequences of empiricism regarding
mathematical knowledge.
10See [2, 45, 52, 60, 62]. Moreover, proof-checking is generally a feasible operation, routinely implemented
in a standard computer-aided proof package.
11Cf. [67, p.90]: “. . . [co-reflection] can be interpreted only according to the intuitionistic meaning of
implication, so that it expresses the trivial observation that, as soon as a proof of A is given, A becomes
known”.
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truth, and should therefore be endorsed as foundational for a properly intuition-
istic epistemology.
2.3.2 Knowledge Does Not Yield Proof
If not all verifications are BHK-compliant proofs then it follows that verification-based
knowledge does not necessarily yield proof, and consequently that reflection is not a valid
intuitionistic epistemic principle. It is possible, hence, to have knowledge of a proposition
without possessing its proof, i.e. without it being intuitionistically true.12
The BHK reading of reflection KA → A says that given a proof of KA one can
always construct a proof of A, that is it asserts that there is a uniform procedure, or
construction, which given a proof of KA returns a proof of A itself. Since we allow that
KA does not necessarily produce specific proofs this requirement is not met for intuition-
istic knowledge, and a fortiori for belief. What uniform procedure is there that can take
any adequate, non-proof, verification of A and return a proof of A? There is no such con-
struction. Consider the following counter-examples against the factivity of intuitionistic
verification-based knowledge.
The following four examples correspond to the principal reading ofKA as A has a proof,
not necessarily specified in the process of verification:
Zero-knowledge protocols A class of cryptographic protocols, normally probabilistic,
by which the prover can convince the verifier that a given statement is true, without
conveying any additional information apart from the fact that the statement is true. The
canonical way these protocols work is that the prover possesses a proof p of A, and convinces
the verifier that A holds without disclosing p.
Testimony of an authority Even concerning mathematical knowledge reflection fails.
Take Fermat’s Last Theorem. For the educated mathematician it is credible to claim that it
is known, but most mathematicians could not produce a proof of it. Indeed, more generally,
any claim to mathematical knowledge based on the authority of mathematical experts is not
intuitionistically factive. It is legitimate to claim to know a theorem when one understands
its content, and can use it in one’s reasoning, without being in a position to produce or
recite the proof.
Classified sources In a social situation, imagine a statement of A coming from a most
reliable source but with a classified origin. So, there is no access to the ‘strict proof’ of A.
Should we abstain from reasoning about A as something known unless we gain full access
to the strict proof? This is not how society works. We treat KA as weaker than A, and
keep reasoning constructively without drawing any conclusion about a specific proof of A.
12 Cf. [95, p.68] “. . .K requires more than warranted assertion. However, it does not follow that
K requires strict proof; that would not be a reasonable requirement when K is applied to empirical
statements. . . ”.
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Existential generalisation Somebody stole your wallet in the subway. You have all the
evidence for this: the wallet is gone, your backpack has a cut in the corresponding pocket,
but you have no idea who did it. You definitely know that ‘there is a person who stole my
wallet” (in logical form, ∃xS(x), where S(x) stands for ‘x stole my wallet’) so you have
a justification p of K(∃xS(x)). If K(∃xS(x)) → ∃xS(x) held intuitionistically, you would
have a constructive proof q of ∃xS(x). However, a constructive proof of the existential
sentence ∃xS(x) requires a witness a for x and a proof b that S(a) holds. You are nowhere
near meeting this requirement. So, K(∃xS(x))→ ∃xS(x) does not hold intuitionistically.
Here are examples which can be captured by the broader constructive reading of KA
(*):
Highly probable truth Suppose there is a computerized probabilistic verification proce-
dure, which is constructive in nature, that supports a proposition A with a cosmologically
small probability of error, so its result satisfies the strictest practical criteria for truth.
Then any reasonable agent accepts this certification as adequate justification of A, hence A
is known. Moreover, observing the computer program to terminate with success, we have
a proof that KA. However, we do not have a proof of A in the sense required by BHK; we
cannot even claim that such a proof exists.
Empirical knowledge Suppose that some phenomenon has been repeatedly observed
under optimal experimental conditions. After a certain number of repeated observations
these are taken to confirm some hypothesis, A, that predicted the phenomenon. For prac-
tical scientific purposes these observations are a verification of the hypothesis, hence it is
legitimate to claim KA, but there is no reason to claim having a BHK-compliant proof of
this.
If we allow that knowledge may be gained by any of the methods above then reflection
is not valid according to the BHK semantics.
How might we be in a position of having a proof of KA without thereby being in a
position to obtain a proof of A itself? Consider the example of zero-knowledge protocols,
which by design yield verifications of statements without disclosing any further information
about them. Given a proof that A is verified in this manner is there a general method for
constructing a proof of A itself from this information? Clearly not. This is because, in
general, claiming
it is proved that A is verified
is a weaker statement than
it is proved that A.
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All the former statement gives us is a guarantee that A has a verification, which by assump-
tion does not necessarily yield an explicit proof.
The invalidity of the straightforward constructive reading of the classical reflection
KA → A is particularly evident on the type-theoretical interpretation of KA. Given a
truncated proposition inh(A) all the information one has is that A is inhabited, hence one
knows there is a proof, but inh(A) does not deliver any such inhabitant, hence one is not
in a position to assert A since one cannot produce an element of the type.
2.3.3 Intuitionistic Reflection and the Truth Condition on Knowledge
Nevertheless reflection has often been taken to be practically definitive of knowledge from
a constructive standpoint. For instance, Williamson [95], in outlining his system of intu-
itionistic epistemic logic affirms that KA → A holds. Similarly Proietti, [79], argues that
knowledge is factive in his system of intuitionistic epistemic logic. Wright states that an
operator could not be a knowledge operator if it were not factive [100].13 More generally still
the principle KA → A is probably the only principle about knowledge that has not been
seriously contested.14 And, of course, it is implied by virtually every extant definition of
knowledge. Must not our arguments above be wrong in some fashion? Are we not arguing
the intuitionist is committed to holding that false propositions can be known? No, on the
contrary: intuitionistic reflection
KA→ ¬¬A
is classically equivalent to reflection and hence is acceptable both classically
and intuitionistically.
Every analysis of knowledge accepts the truth condition on knowledge, that only true
propositions can be known and that false propositions cannot be known. It is this, and not
reflection per se, which is definitive of knowledge. An intuitionistic formalization of the
truth condition for knowledge is the principle of intuitionistic reflection which can be read
as
if A is known then it is impossible that A is false.
An attempt to rewrite it into the ‘simpler’ form KA→ A fails intuitionistically: reflection
is strictly stronger intuitionistically than intuitionistic reflection and, as we argue, is not
intuitionistically valid.
13“I take this to be a non-negotiable feature of the concept of knowledge. If a theory takes a view of
something which it purports to regard as knowledge, but which lacks this feature, it is not a theory of
knowledge” [100, p.242].
14Hazlett’s [47, 48] would seem to be the only such challenge. However Hazlett challenges the idea that
the truth of A is necessary for the truth of the utterance ‘S knows A’; utterances of ‘S knows A’ may be
true even if A is false. He is careful to distinguish this challenge from the claim that it is possible to know
false propositions – that he does not challenge. Hazlett’s arguments do not appear to be relevant to our
concerns since we are not occupied with the truth conditions of utterances of knowledge ascriptions, but
the logical analysis of the epistemic operator.
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Intuitionistic reflection can be interpreted from two perspectives, both illuminating with
respect to what it captures.
On the one hand, intuitionistic reflection says that to have knowledge is to have a
verification which rules out the possibility of the intuitionistic falsehood of A, that is the
possibility of a disproof of A.15 Intuitionistic knowledge, hence, establishes the logical
possibility of the intuitionistic truth of a proposition. Where classical knowledge guarantees
the (classical) truth of a proposition, intuitionistic reflection guarantees the possibility of
proof (this is made vivid in the Kripke semantics developed below, see section 4.1).
On the other hand, via the embedding of classical logic into intuitionistic logic we
see that intuitionistic reflection expresses just what classical reflection does. The double
negation translation of classical logic into intuitionistic logic (cf. [14, 20, 44, 58]) suggests
the informal intuitionistic reading of ¬¬A as ‘A is classically true’. From this point of view
intuitionistic reflection expresses that intuitionistic knowledge yields classical truth, i.e.
knowledge of A yields the truth of A but without a specific witness. A verification yielding
knowledge provides sufficient information to claim the proof-less truth of A, which is just
what reflection claims classically. The double negation embedding of CPC into IPC extends
to the classical reflection principle – principle 4 below, which is equivalent to intuitionistic
reflection – accordingly intuitionistic reflection expresses as much as its classical
counterpart does. Though classical reflection does not hold intuitionistically nothing
is lost, the intuitions that support classical reflection can be captured in an intuitionistic
setting.
Here is a list of other intuitionistically meaningful logical ways to express the truth
condition:
1. ¬A→ ¬KA;
2. ¬(KA ∧ ¬A);
3. ¬K⊥;
4. ¬¬(KA→ A).
Intuitionistically 1, 2 and 3 can be considered as directly saying that knowledge of
falsehood is impossible. 4 can be seen as saying that reflection is classically valid, or
alternatively that it is logically possible for verification to yield proof.
Principles 1, 2 and 4 are classically equivalent to reflection, and all 1 – 4 are intuitionis-
tically strictly weaker than reflection. In this way we see that intuitionistically reflection is
not required in order to maintain the truth condition on knowledge, or to distinguish belief
from knowledge.
As we will see, in the presence of co-reflection all 1 – 4 and intuitionistic reflection
are equivalent. Theoretically 3 is the simplest, but we pick intuitionistic reflection since it
most clearly expresses the intuitionistic notion of factivity (see section 3 and appendix B
for more on the relation between these expressions of the intuitionistic truth condition).
15See [92] for an extension of BHK by dually refuted falsehood.
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In the absence of the truth condition we do not rule out that intuitionistically verified
propositions may be false. For example, before the European discovery of Australia all
available evidence supported the proposition ‘all swans are white’; this turned out to be
false and can be taken as an instance of verification-based belief which may be false, which
is captured by a logic without intuitionistic reflection.
Given the equivalences noted above, the truth condition asserts a kind of provable con-
sistency. For example, while the proposition that ‘all swans are white’ does not imply a
contradiction, and hence is consistent, this does not imply that it is possible to know false
consistent propositions. The truth condition requires that the consistency of a proposi-
tion be provable. Since ‘all swans are white’ is not provably consistent it is ruled out as
knowledge by the truth condition.
3 Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic
We are now in a position to define the systems of intuitionistic belief and knowledge, IEL−
and IEL respectively. These systems, we argue, respect the intended BHK meaning of
intuitionism and incorporate a reasonable verification-based epistemic operator.
The language is that of intuitionistic propositional logic augmented with the epistemic
propositional operator K. The simplest system, IEL−, the logic of intuitionistic beliefs, is
given by:
Definition 1 (IEL−).
Axioms
1. Axioms of propositional intuitionistic logic;
2. K(A→ B)→ (KA→ KB); (distribution)
3. A→ KA. (co-reflection)
Rule Modus Ponens
The next system we consider is the logic of intuitionistic knowledge, IEL (which is, at
the same time, the logic of provably consistent intuitionistic beliefs):
Definition 2 (IEL). IEL = IEL− +KA→ ¬¬A (intuitionistic reflection)
Immediately from these definitions, we conclude
IEL− ⊆ IEL.
From model-theoretical considerations in section 4 it follows that this inclusion is strict
(Theorem 3).
Proposition 1. In L ∈ {IEL−, IEL}
1. The rule of K-necessitation, ⊢ A ⇒ ⊢ KA, is derivable.
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2. The deduction theorem holds.
3. Uniform substitution holds.
4. L is a normal intuitionistic modal logic.16
5. Positive and negative introspection hold; ⊢ KP → KKP , ⊢ ¬KP → K¬KP .
Proof.
1. By co-reflection.
2. From 1, and the fact that intuitionistic propositional logic validates the deduction
theorem.
3. By induction on the complexity of formulas.
4. From 3 L is closed under substitution for propositional variables.
5. Both are instances of axiom A→ KA, with KP and ¬KP for A respectively.
Proposition 2. For L ∈ {IEL−, IEL}
L ⊢ K(A ∧B)↔ (KA ∧KB).
Proof. The standard derivation of this fact uses distribution and necessitation, both
present in L.
Theorem 1 (Truth Condition). IEL proves
1. ¬K⊥;
2. ¬(KA ∧ ¬A);
3. ¬A→ ¬KA;
4. ¬¬(KA→ A).
Proof.
For 1:
1. K⊥ → ¬¬⊥ - intuitionistic reflection;
2. ¬¬⊥ → ⊥ - IPC theorem;
3. ¬K⊥ - from 1 and 2.
For 2:
1. KA ∧ ¬A - assumption;
2. ¬¬A ∧ ¬A - by co-reflection;
3. ⊥ - from 2;
4. ¬(KA ∧ ¬A).
16See [9, 10].
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For 3:
1. ¬¬¬A→ ¬KA - contrapositive of intuitionistic reflection;
2. ¬A→ ¬KA - by ¬X ↔ ¬¬¬X .
For 4, continue with:
3. ¬¬KA→ ¬¬A - contrapositive of 2;
4. ¬¬(KA→ A) - by intuitionistic tautology (¬¬X → ¬¬Y )↔ ¬¬(X → Y ).
It is easy to check that IEL− with each of ¬K⊥, ¬(KA∧¬A), ¬A→ ¬KA, ¬¬(KA→
A), as additional axioms is equivalent to IEL. Since each of these principles can be regarded
as expressing the truth condition on knowledge, we see that the axiom KA → ¬¬A is an
adequate intuitionistic expression of this idea.17
Note that as a corollary of part 4 of the theorem above, and Glivenko’s Theorem, the
classical logic of knowledge S5 as well as logics of belief K, D, KD4, KD45 can be Glivenko-
embedded into IEL: the double negation of each theorem of these logics is derivable in IEL.
This embedding, however, is not faithful; obviously IEL ⊢ ¬¬(A→ KA) but in none of the
classical logics just mentioned is it the case that ⊢ A → KA.18 This makes more precise
the claim above that IEL offers a more general framework than the classical epistemic one;
classical epistemic reasoning is sound in IEL, but the intuitionistic epistemic language is
rather more expressive.19
3.1 Intuitionistic Knowledge as Provably Consistent Belief
Our analysis shows that in the intuitionistic propositional setting, knowledge and provably
consistent belief are axiomatized by the same logical system, IEL.
This situation is quite different from what we observe in classical epistemic logic. Indeed,
in the classical setting there is a variety of systems for consistent belief: D, KD4, KD45,
and systems for knowledge: T, S4, S5, that reflect different shades of belief and knowledge.
However, similar axiom systems based on intuitionistic logic with the co-reflection principle
A→ KA,
are all equivalent to IEL.20 Does this mean that intuitionistic knowledge is just provably
consistent belief? Not necessarily. However, it does mean that the basic intuitionistic
epistemic logic IEL does not distinguish intuitionistic knowledge from intuitionistic provably
consistent belief, just like the classical epistemic logic S5 does not distinguish knowledge
from true belief.
17See also appendix B.
18The same holds for the Kolmogorov embedding, see note 2.
19Proof theory for IEL has been developed in [61], which established cut-elimination theorems and demon-
strated that it is PSPACE complete.
20Given that the classical truth condition in T, S4, and S5 is formulated by intuitionistic reflection
KA→ ¬¬A, rather than classical reflection KA→ A.
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3.2 K as ¬¬
[26] proposes an intuitionistic modal logic, Hdn✷, in which ✷ is read as intuitionistic ¬¬,
i.e.
✷A↔ ¬¬A.
Hdn✷ validates A → ✷A and invalidates ✷A → A. Could Dosˇen’s ✷ be an intuitionistic
epistemic operator?
We argue not. If it were it would follow that all classical theorems are known intu-
itionistically. By Glivenko’s Theorem, if CPC ⊢ A then Hdn✷ ⊢ ✷A. Such a ✷ is not
intuitionistic knowledge but rather a simulation of classical knowledge within IPC.
Technically speaking, Dosˇen’s modality ¬¬ is strictly weaker thanK: IEL proves KA→
¬¬A whereas ¬¬A → KA is not valid (e.g. when A is the law of excluded middle21).
Furthermore, Hdn✷ ⊢ ✷(X → Y ) ↔ (✷X → ✷Y ) but neither of our systems have
K(X → Y )↔ (KX → KY ).
As a formal logical system, Hdn✷ strictly extends IEL.
3.3 Provability Semantics
Go¨del, in [45], offered a provability semantics for intuitionistic logic via a syntactical em-
bedding of IPC into the classical modal logic S4, which he considered a calculus for classical
provability. By extending S4 with a verification modality, V, and specifying an appropriate
translation, we can explain each of our systems IEL− and IEL in the way Go¨del explained
intuitionistic logic by interpreting them in the logic of provability S4.
Let S4V− be the classical bi-modal logic with the axioms and rules of S4 for ✷, and the
axioms and rules of modal logic K for V, along with the additional axiom ✷A→ VA. Let
S4V be S4V− + ¬✷V⊥. By design, S4V− may be regarded as the basic logic of verification,
and S4V as the basic logic of consistent verification. The Go¨del translation
tr(A) = ‘box every subformula of A’
yields an embedding of L ∈ {IEL−, IEL} into L✷ ∈ {S4V
−, S4V}:
L ⊢ A ⇒ L✷ ⊢ tr(A).
22
The Go¨del translation interprets Kp as ✷V✷p, hence the verification of p in S4V is
rather the checking of the provability of p. The ideology behind our systems also allows
a more direct reading of verification under which Kp constructively verifies p itself rather
than ‘p is provable’, (*) above. This reading can be captured by the translation of Kp
21Hence the classical truth of a proposition does not imply that it is verified.
22It follows from the results of [7, 80] that this embedding is faithful for L = IEL−, IEL. Note that there
a stronger version of S4V was given with ¬V⊥ instead of ¬✷V⊥; ¬✷V⊥ enables an extension of the
arithmetical semantics for the Logic of Proofs [2, 4] to be given for IEL, , see [81].
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as ✷Vp which can be handled by the bimodal logic of constructive verification, for L✷ ∈
{S4V−, S4V}
L′
✷
= L✷ + (Vp→ V✷p).
We leave this line of research to future studies (see [80]).
4 Models for Intuitionistic Epistemic Logic
Definition 3 (IEL−-model). A model for IEL− is a quadruple 〈W,R,, E〉 such that
1. 〈W,R,〉 is an intuitionistic model: 〈W,R〉 is a non-empty partial order (R is a
‘cognition’ binary relation on W ),  is a monotonic evaluation of propositional letters
in W ;
2. E is a binary ‘knowledge’ relation on W coordinated with the ‘cognition’ relation R:
• E(u) ⊆ R(u) for any state u;23
• uRv yields E(v) ⊆ E(u);
3.  is extended to epistemic assertions as
• u  KA iff v  A for all v ∈ E(u).
A formula A is true in a model, if A holds at each world of this model. IEL−  A, or
 A for short, means that A holds in each IEL−-model.
In Kripke model-theoretic terms the intuitionistic truth of A is represented as the impos-
sibility of a situation in which A does not hold. To represent K in the same model-theoretic
terms we suggest the following: in a given world u, there is an ‘audit’ set of possible worlds
E(u), the set of states E-accessible from u, in which verifications could possibly occur. An
R-successor of a state u can be thought of as an ‘in principle (logically) possible’ cognition
state given u, and an E-successor can be thought of as a ‘possible’ state of verification.
Belief, hence, is ‘truth in any audit world’, i.e. no matter when and how an audit occurs,
it should confirm A.
Note that E(u) does not necessarily contain u, hence the truth of KA at u does not
guarantee that A holds at u. Therefore, KA → A does not necessarily hold. In the
extreme E(u) can coincide with R(u), in which case KA → A would hold. Furthermore,
the condition E ⊆ R coupled with the monotonicity of truth w.r.t. R ensures the validity
of A→ KA.
As for intuitionistic logic, we can think of IEL−-models as representing the states of
information of an ideal researcher. Audit sets are monotone with respect to intuitionistic
accessibility R. This corresponds to the Kripkean ideology that R denotes the discovery
23Let R(u) and E(u) denote the R-successors and the E-successors, respectively, of some state u.
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process, and that things become more and more certain in the process of discovery. As the
set of intuitionistic possibilities, R(u), shrink, audit sets, E(u), shrink as well. The mono-
tonicity of truth represents the idealization of the researcher’s memory; once a proposition
becomes true, its truth is retained forever.
Definition 4 (IEL-model). An IEL-model is an IEL−-model as above with the additional
condition that E is non-empty:
4. E(u) 6= ∅ for each u ∈ W .
That audits are consistent is reflected in condition (4): in IEL-models ¬K⊥ holds.
Indeed, for each world u, E(u) 6= ∅, then there is a v ∈ E(u). Since v 6 ⊥, u 6 K⊥ for
each u, hence w  ¬K⊥ for each w.
Again, note that E(u) need not contain u, hence reflection is not guaranteed to hold.
Note that the truth of KA at u in an IEL-model does guarantee that A is true at some
v ∈ R(u), since E(u) ⊆ R(u) and E(u) 6= ∅, this guarantees ¬¬A is true at u also (cf.
Theorem 2); this illustrates our earlier comment that KA establishes the possibility of the
intuitionistic truth of A.
In the limit case where R(u) = {u}, the audit set E(u) is also {u}, and hence coincides
with R(u), i.e. ‘leaf nodes’ are E-reflexive. Note that at ‘leaf nodes’, intuitionistic evaluation
behaves classically; at such a u, u  KA → A for all A’s. In the epistemic case, at ‘leaf
worlds’ the classical factivity of K holds.
Lemma 1 (Monotonicity). For each model and a formula A, if u  A and uRv then
v  A.
Proof. It suffices to check IEL−-models. Monotonicity holds for the propositional connec-
tives, we show this just for K. Assume u  KA, then x  A for each x ∈ E(u). Take an
arbitrary v such that uRv and arbitrary w ∈ E(v), hence w ∈ E(u). Therefore, w  A and
hence v  KA.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). For L ∈ {IEL−, IEL}, if L ⊢ A then L  A.
Proof. By induction on derivations in IEL. We check the epistemic clauses only.
1)K(A→ B)→ (KA→ KB) for IEL−-models. It suffices to check that u  K(A→ B)
and u  KA yield u  KB. Assume u  K(A → B) and u  KA, then for all v ∈ E(u),
v  A→ B and v  A, hence v  B. By definition, this means that u  KB.
2) A→ KA for IEL−-models. Assume u  A. By monotonicity, for all v ∈ R(u), v  A.
Since E(u) ⊆ R(u), for any w ∈ E(u), w  A, but then u  KA as well.
3) KA → ¬¬A for IEL-models. Assume u  KA. By monotonicity, for each v ∈ R(u),
v  KA as well. Pick an arbitrary v ∈ R(u); it suffices now to show that v 6 ¬A. Since
E(v) 6= ∅, there is w ∈ E(v) ⊆ E(u) ⊆ R(u), and, by definitions, w  A. This yields that
v 6 ¬A, hence u  ¬¬A.
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Theorem 3. IEL− ⊂ IEL.
Proof. IEL− 6= IEL. Consider the following IEL−-model M1: W is a singleton, R is
reflexive and E is empty.
1
•
R

Figure 1: IEL−-model M1
Since E(1) = ∅, 1  KA, but since 1 1 A, 1  ¬A hence 1 1 ¬¬A.
Theorem 4 (Completeness). For L ∈ {IEL−, IEL}, if L  A then L ⊢ A.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 5. For L ∈ {IEL−, IEL},
L 0 KA→ A.
Proof. Consider the following model: 1R2, R is reflexive (and vacuously transitive),
E(1) = E(2) = {2}, p is atomic and 2  p.
1 2
p
• •
R
//
E
++
E

Figure 2: IEL-model M2
Clearly, 1  Kp and 1 1 p, hence
1 6 Kp→ p.
ModelM2 exemplifies the point that intuitionistic verification guarantees the possibility
of intuitionistic truth (see section 2.3.3):
1  Kp→ ¬¬p.
In the logics of intuitionistic knowledge, though reflection does not hold generally, it
does hold for negated formulas.
Theorem 6. IEL ⊢ K¬A→ ¬A.24
24It is easy to check that K¬A→ ¬A could be used instead of KA→ ¬¬A to axiomatize IEL.
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Proof.
1. K¬A→ ¬¬¬A - intuitionistic reflection;
2. K¬A→ ¬A - from 1 by ¬X ↔ ¬¬¬X .
Intuitionistic knowledge and negation commute: the impossibility of verifying A is
equivalent to verifying that A cannot possibly hold.
Theorem 7. IEL ⊢ ¬KA↔ K¬A.
Proof. ‘←’ follows by Theorem 6 and Theorem 1 part 3. Let us check ‘→’:
1. A→ KA - co-reflection;
2. ¬KA→ ¬A - contrapositive of 1;
3. ¬A→ K¬A - co-reflection;
4. ¬KA→ K¬A - from 2 and 3.
In logics of intuitionistic knowledge, the impossibility of verification is equivalent to the
impossibility of proof, see section 6.3 for discussion.
Theorem 8. IEL ⊢ ¬KA↔ ¬A.
Proof. ‘→’ is shown in Theorem 7, line 2. Let us check ‘←’:
1. ¬A - assumption;
2. K¬A - from 1 and co-reflection;
3. ¬KA - from 2 and Theorem 7.
Within the intuitionistic knowledge framework, no truth is unverifiable, see section 6.3
for discussion.
Theorem 9. IEL ⊢ ¬(¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A).
Proof.
1. ¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A - assumption;
2. K¬A ∧K¬¬A - by Theorem 7;
3. ¬A ∧ ¬¬A - by Theorem 6;
4. ⊥ - from 3;
5. ¬(¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A) - from 1–4.
Intuitionistic verifications do not have the disjunction property.
Theorem 10. For L ∈ {IEL−, IEL},
L 0 K(A ∨B)→ (KA ∨KB).
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Proof. Consider the following model. 1R2, 1R3 (R is reflexive); 1E2, 1E3, 2E2, 3E3; p is
atomic and 3  p. Since 2, 3  p ∨ ¬p, 1  K(p ∨ ¬p). However, 1 1 Kp, and 1 1 K¬p.
3
1
2
p• •
•
R
__❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄❄
R
??⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧⑧ E
GG
E

E
WW
E

Figure 3: IEL-model M3
Theorem 11. For L ∈ {IEL−, IEL}, the reflection rule ⊢ KA ⇒ ⊢ A is admissible in L.
Proof. Suppose 0 A, hence, by completeness, there is an L-modelM = 〈W,R,, E〉 with
a node x ∈ W s.t. x 1 A. Construct a new L-model, N = 〈W ′, R′,′, E ′〉 such that
• W ′ = W ∪ {x0} (x0 is a new node);
• x0R′u and x0E ′u for all u ∈ W ′, R′ coincides with R and E ′ coincides with E on W ;
• x0 6′ p for each atomic sentence p and ′ coincides with  on W .
Clearly M is a generated submodel of N , hence ′ A coincides with  A on W for all A.
Furthermore, x0 1
′ KA, since x 1′ A and x0E
′x. Therefore, L 0 KA also.
Theorem 12 (Disjunction Property). For L ∈ {IEL−, IEL},
if L ⊢ A ∨ B then either L ⊢ A or L ⊢ B.
Proof. Assume 0 A and 0 B. By completeness, 1 A and 1 B. Hence there are L-models
M1 = 〈W1, R1,1, E1〉 and M2 = 〈W2, R2,2, E2〉 with nodes x1 ∈ W1 and x2 ∈ W2 such
that x1 11 A and x2 12 B. We define a new L-model M = 〈W,R,, E〉 such that
• W = W1∪W2 ∪{x0} where x0 /∈ W1 and x0 /∈ W2 (W1 and W2 are assumed disjoint).
• x0Ru and x0Eu for all u ∈ W , R coincides with Ri on Wi, and E coincides with Ei
on Wi, i = 1, 2.
• x0 1 p for each atomic sentence p,  coincides with i on Wi, i = 1, 2.
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It is easy to check that for each i = 1, 2 and each x ∈ Wi,
x  A iff x i A.
We claim that x0 1 A ∨ B, hence L 0 A ∨ B. Indeed, if x0  A ∨ B, then x0  A or
x0  B. If x0  A then, by monotonicity, x1  A, hence x1 1 A which contradicts our
assumptions. Case x0  B is symmetric.
Despite Theorem 10, intuitionistic epistemic logic has a weak disjunction property for
verifications.
Corollary 1. For L ∈ {IEL−, IEL},
if L ⊢ K(A ∨ B) then either L ⊢ KA or L ⊢ KB.
Proof. Assume L ⊢ K(A ∨ B) then, by Theorem 11, L ⊢ A ∨ B, hence L ⊢ A or L ⊢ B.
In which case L ⊢ KA or L ⊢ KB by co-reflection.
4.1 Modeling Knowledge vs. Belief
As an illustration of our informal remarks, in 2.3.3, on the difference between intuitionistic
belief and knowledge consider again the example of ‘all swans are white’. The following
IEL− model,M4, seems to model fairly the belief of an agent before the European discovery
of Australia. 1R2, 1R3 (R is reflexive); 1E3; p is ‘all swans are white’ and 3  p.
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Figure 4: IEL−-model M4
The underlying intuitionistic model represents the logical possibilites of developing the
agent’s information regarding the truth of p. The epistemic part of the model represents
the verifications the agent has performed. In this case all verifications confirm p, hence
Kp holds at 1. However this is a mere belief: the truth condition fails because 1 1 ¬¬A.
This models the historical situation in which it was considered “known” that all swans are
white, but which was in fact only a belief because the situation in which p does not hold
was not considered epistemically possible.
By contrast, consider the IEL model M3 from Theorem 10. This has the same logical
possibilities, but the agent has verified each of them. In this case Kp does not hold at 1; p
is not known because there is verification that it can be false.
5 IEL and Intuitionistic Responses to the Knowability
Paradox
The Church-Fitch ‘knowability paradox’ is an informal interpretation of a classical deriva-
tion in bi-modal logic with the modalities K and ✸ discovered by Church [15] and reported
by Fitch [37]. The proof shows that
A→ ✸KA (verificationist knowability)
classically implies
A→ KA. (omniscience)
Proposition 3 (Church-Fitch). Verificationist knowability as a schema classically yields
omniscience.
Proof.
1. (p ∧ ¬Kp)→ ✸K(p ∧ ¬Kp) - verificationist knowability;
2. K(p ∧ ¬Kp) - assumption;
3. Kp ∧K¬Kp - from 2 by standard modal reasoning;
4. Kp ∧ ¬Kp - from 3 and reflection;
5. ¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) - from 2–4;
6. ✷¬K(p ∧ ¬Kp) - from 5 and necessitation;
7. ¬✸K(p ∧ ¬Kp) - from 6 and ✷¬X → ¬✸X ;
8. ¬(p ∧ ¬Kp) - from 1 and 7;
9. p→ ¬¬Kp - from 8 and ¬(X ∧ Y )→ (X → ¬Y );
10. p→ Kp - from 9 and double negation elimination.
The informal interpretation of this formal proof takes it to show that
all truths are knowable
implies
all truths are known.
That all truths are knowable is taken to be definitive of intuitionistic truth, hence the
‘knowability paradox’ appears to be a reductio ad absurdum of the very idea of intuition-
ism.25
Intuitionistic responses to the paradox so far have accepted this informal interpretation
of the Church-Fitch construction, and hence been committed to showing that an intu-
itionistic conception of truth and knowledge does not yield co-reflection, and hence is not
25We use the term ‘knowability paradox’ to denote the informal argument, based on the proof, which is
supposed to refute intuitionism. The term ‘Church-Fitch proof’ denotes the derivation itself.
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committed to omniscience, e.g. [35, 36, 79, 88, 89, 93, 94, 95, 96]. We argue that the proper
intuitionistic response is simply that there is no paradox;26 intuitionistically the ‘knowa-
bility paradox’ is a pseudo-problem which holds only from a classical standpoint. The
supposedly devastating conclusions of the knowability paradox are solely the product of
a classical reading of the principles of the Church-Fitch construction, combined with an
incorrect representation of intuitionistic truth in a classical framework.
5.1 IEL Response to the Knowability Paradox
Construed as a problem for intuitionism the ‘knowability paradox’ depends on the following
assumptions:
1. A→ KA means all truths are known.
2. A→ ✸KA means all truths are knowable.
3. That all truths are knowable is definitive of intuitionistic truth.
Since the ‘knowability paradox’ incorporates a particular view about the nature of
intuitionistic truth and its relationship to knowledge, we restrict our discussion to the
perspective afforded to us by our system of intuitionistic knowledge, IEL (though much of
what we say holds just as well for intuitionistic belief). From this perspective we argue
none of these hold.
5.1.1 Reply to 1
A → KA can be understood as claiming all truths are known only on a classical reading.
Intuitionistically it means something very different, namely, constructive truth, i.e. proof,
yields verification/knowledge, which is central to an intuitionistic view of knowledge.
5.1.2 Reply to 2
Knowability is taken to be a definitive characteristic of intuitionistic truth, but A→ ✸KA
is not a good formalization of this idea in classical logic.
As a classical principle it does not capture the intended (intuitionistic) relation between
truth and knowledge (see [5, 6]). The straightforward classical logic reading of A→ ✸KA
says all classical truths are knowable, which is plainly false. To be an adequate classical for-
malization of an intuitionistic notion of knowability one has to ‘build in’ the constructivity
of intuitionistic truth; when this is done27 no paradoxical conclusions follow.
As an intuitionistic principle it is not immediately clear what A→ ✸KA says. This may
be construed as saying that ‘all (intuitionistic) truths are knowable/verifiable’, but it is not
clear what theoretical or expressive advantage is gained by adopting this, given the stronger
26See e.g. [36, 57, 67, 83].
27In the principles SK and MK of [5, 6].
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principle of co-reflection A → KA holds intuitionistically. Perhaps, a combination of
reading BHK-proofs as timeless platonic entities not necessarily available to the knower with
a strict reading of KA as A is actually known (cf. section 2.2) could provide a reasonable
semantics for the knowability principle A→ ✸KA:
if a proposition has a proof then it is possible to actually know it.
5.1.3 Reply to 3
The characteristic feature of intuitionistic truth is its constructivity; a proposition is true
if there is a proof of it. A proof is an especially strict kind of verification; hence intuition-
istic truth yields verification, hence knowledge. But it is precisely for this reason that no
intuitionistic truth is beyond the possibility of knowledge; intuitionistic truth is knowable
because it is constructive. Hence constructivity, not knowability, is the definitive feature of
intuitionistic truth.
Moreover, we argue that A → KA is the intuitionistic formal expression of the con-
structivity of intuitionistic truth. Knowability in its different possible forms appears to
be its immediate consequence. For example, A → KA implies each of ¬(¬KA ∧ ¬K¬A),
A→ ¬¬KA (see 5.3), and assuming ‘what is proved is possible’ A→ ✸KA. Each of these
may be regarded as possible intuitionistic formalizations of ‘all truths are knowable’. All
are easy consequences of the constructivity of intuitionistic truth.
For these reasons, the ‘knowability paradox’ does not constitute a problem for the
intuitionistic notion of truth.
5.2 Intuitionistic Criticism of Church-Fitch
One line of intuitionistic response has been to criticize the Church-Fitch proof. Williamson
argues, [93], that the proof is intuitionistically propositionally invalid, since it involves a
step of double negation elimination. Intuitionistically Church-Fitch establishes only
A→ ¬¬KA (intuitionistic knowability)
which, read intuitionistically, is not paradoxical, hence the intuitionist is not committed to
co-reflection.28
Note, however, that the conclusions of the Church-Fitch proof in either classical or intu-
itionistic form, A→ KA or A→ ¬¬KA, are valid in IEL; neither depend on verificationist
knowability or on the Church-Fitch proof. As a derivation, the Church-Fitch proof turns
out to be irrelevant to intuitionistic foundations; arguments against intuitionistic truth and
knowledge have to take a different approach.
28Note that though reflection is used in the proof, line 4 of Proposition 3, it is of the intuitionistically
acceptable kind K¬A→ ¬A, Theorem 5.
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5.3 Intuitionistic Knowability
Another intuitionistic approach to showing that co-reflection/omniscience does not hold
argues that intuitionistic knowability itself is a better formalisation than verificationist
knowability of the informal idea that all truths are knowable, or of the feature of the
relation between intuitionistic truth and knowledge which this is intended to express (see
[23, 36, 83]).
There is much to recommend this, though, following our comments in 5.1.2 and 5.1.3,
we would argue that it, like verificationist knowability, does not capture the basic relation
between intuitionistic truth and knowledge. Intuitionistic knowability can be read as a
formalization of ‘all truths are knowable’; Dummett [36, p.52] reads it as “if A is true
then the possibility that A will come to be known always remains open”. It can also
be read as a form of weak co-reflection – indeed one might consider weak versions of our
intuitionistic epistemic systems formulated on its basis (see section 6.3 for further discussion
of A → ¬¬KA) – but it too, like verificationist knowability, does not fully capture the
relation between intuitionistic truth and knowledge.
6 Criticisms of IEL Principles
6.1 Intuitionistic Rejection of Co-reflection
6.1.1 Hart
The common feature of intuitionistic responses to the ‘knowability paradox’ has been the
commitment to rejecting co-reflection, based on accepting its classical reading as omni-
science. From the very first intuitionistic response to the knowability paradox, we find this
rejection even in the face of direct, intuitionistically acceptable, arguments for the validity
of co-reflection.
Hart’s [46, p.165] sets the pattern – though he thinks such a response is mistaken.
Incidentally, on an intuitionist reading, it just might be that every truth is known. For
being in an intuitionist position to assert that ∀x(Fx→ Gx) requires a method which
given an object and a proof that it is F , yields a proof that it is G. In the present
instance this means: suppose we are given a sentence . . . and a proof that it is true.
Read the proof; thereby you come to know that the sentence is true. Reflecting on
your recent learning, you recognize that the sentence is now known by you; this shows
that the truth is known. If this argument is intuitionistically acceptable . . . then I
think that fact reflects poorly on intuitionism; surely we have good inductive grounds
for believing that there are truths as yet unknown.
This has all the elements of a justification of intuitionistic co-reflection. However Hart
does not apply the argument to the reading of co-reflection, instead treating his argument
that ‘proof yields knowledge’ as a justification for ‘all truths are known’. This is unstable,
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one can reject intuitionism altogether and the argument for the validity of co-reflection with
it, of course, but one cannot argue that a classical understanding of a principle invalidates
an intuitionistic reading of it.
6.1.2 Williamson
Williamson, in [93, 94, 96], considers Hart’s argument supporting A → KA, but rejects it
for the same reason, and seeks to devise a form of intuitionistic semantics which invalidates
co-reflection.
To do this Williamson [94] distinguishes between proof-tokens and proof-types. Proof-
tokens are of the same type just if they have the same structure and conclusion, though
they may be effected at different times. Co-reflection holds for proof-tokens, any proof-
token of A can be turned into a proof-token of KA, but not for proof-types. In the case
of proof-types A → KA says that there is a function which takes a proof-type of A to a
proof-type of KA. In this context ‘KA’ is read as ‘there exists a time t such that A will
have been proved at t’. Moreover, the validity of co-reflection requires that this function
be unitype, meaning that if inputs, p and q, are of the same type then the outputs, f(p)
and f(q), are of the same type also. Hence “a proof of A→ KA is a unitype function that
evidently takes any proof token of A to a proof token, for some time t, of the proposition
that A is proved at t”, [94, p.430]. Williamson’s contention is that such a function does not
exist in all cases. It exists where we already have an input for the function, i.e. a proof
of A. In the case where we do not have an input all we can consider is the function f
itself, which takes us from hypothetical proof-tokens of A to proof-tokens of KA. But such
a function is not unitype. Assume that p and q are token-proofs of A of the same type
carried out at different times, then f(p) and f(q) will be proof tokens of different types.
f(p) is a proof that KA is proved at time t and f(q) is a proof that KA is proved at time
t′. Hence co-reflection is not generally valid.29
In response, we point out that the BHK semantics has no temporal component. Wil-
liamson interprets co-reflection as a kind of universal proof-checking (as do we, see section
2.3.1), but the time at which the proposition was proved is, normally, not essential to
checking a proof’s correctness. Co-reflection asserts correctly that given a proof, x, of A
proof-checking produces another proof, y, that there exists a verification of A, namely a
proof x of A. As we see, co-reflection holds independently of the time x is carried out
or of whether it has already been constructed or is only hypothetical: proof-checking is a
correct procedure the possibility of which is independent of any assumptions about specific
proofs. Williamson interprets co-reflection in a rather non-standard way by adding an
alien temporal component to devise a reading under which co-reflection could fail, but the
intuitionist need not accept this temporal aspect.
29See [67] for an argument that such a function does exist; f cannot operate on hypothetical proof tokens,
since they do not exist; so f can still be defined as a unitype function taking a proof of A and returning a
proof of KA. For an objection to this see [69]. On the debate about the status of hypothetical reasoning
in intuitionism see [21, p.30] and the references contained therein.
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This exhibits the same instability found in Hart’s response, which is attributable to
working in an intuitionistic context without achieving a complete liberation from a classical
conception of knowledge.
6.2 Other Intuitionistic Epistemic Logics
6.2.1 Williamson
The commitment to a classical conception of knowledge is even more in evidence in William-
son’s formulation of an intuitionistic modal epistemic logic [95], a goal of which is to invali-
date co-reflection, while at the same time reflection, KA→ A, is endorsed explicitly. This
is striking since Williamson treats intuitionistic knowledge as a kind of verification, and
acknowledges that verifications need not be proofs.30 Williamson’s intuitionistic epistemic
logic is not based on the standard BHK semantics, but rather on the idea that “intuitionistic
truth consists in the possibility of verification” [95, p. 63]. Hence Williamson’s intuitionistic
epistemic logic does not capture the sense of BHK-based knowledge which is our goal, while
also importing classical epistemic assumptions into an intuitionistic context.
6.2.2 Proietti
A more recent development of the basic approach taken by DeVidi and Solomon [23] is
found in Proietti [79], who develops an intuitionistic epistemic logic based on a Kripkean
semantics.
Proietti’s basic assumptions follow the pattern for intuitionistic responses to the knowa-
bility paradox: that even under intuitionistic assumptions A→ KA is invalid. At the same
time he assumes explicitly that KA→ A holds in the logic.
It should be noted, however, that Proietti is not trying to analyze Brouwer’s original
intuitionistic paradigm of ‘truth as provability’. Proietti’s starting point is rather the later
Kripke semantics of intuitionistic logic, which is not ideologically and technically faithful to
the original intuitionistic foundations. The relationship between truth, proof and knowledge
does not arise in a Kripkean semantic context, since proof is not part of the picture, but
for this very reason the intuitionistic considerations in favor of co-reflection and against
reflection cannot come up.31
30Williamson’s verifications are somewhat different from ours (see note 12), since KA always expresses
an empirical proposition – regarding the contingency of K see 6.3.
31Another system of intuitionistic epistemic logic, presented as extending the BHK semantics to knowl-
edge, is given by Hirai [53, 54]. Reflection is valid in this system, the rationale for this is its admissibility in
classical epistemic logic. Additionally the co-reflection principle is not considered at all. It is clear, however,
that it is not Hirai’s aim to give an intuitionistic analysis of knowledge, but rather to model asynchronous
communication between computational processes. Accordingly it appears that Hirai’s system has the same
classical bias as the systems already discussed, but since his aims are rather divergent from ours, we offer
this only as an observation about the formalism.
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6.3 Percival and the ‘Paradoxes of Intuitionistic Knowledge’
The principle A→ ¬¬KA, we have seen, has been taken either as an intuitionistic solution
to the knowability paradox, or as definitive of the relation between intuitionistic truth and
knowledge, see sections 5.2 and 5.3. Percival objects that intuitionistically A → ¬¬KA
yields paradoxical consequences. Since it is an easy consequence of co-reflection, and hence
valid in IEL−, his arguments are an objection to the BHK view of knowledge and to the
intuitionistic epistemic logic that results from it.
Percival argues that intuitionistically A → ¬¬KA implies ¬KA ↔ ¬A and ¬(¬KA ∧
¬K¬A), both of which are intuitionistically unacceptable [70, p.183]. The first Percival
reads as claiming that the falsehood of A and ignorance of A are logically equivalent intu-
itionistically. But, he argues, this cannot be. Assume that ¬A is a mathematical proposi-
tion, hence necessarily true. Whether A is not known, ¬KA, is a contingent matter. Hence
there must be some state of some model where ¬A holds and ¬KA does not. The second
Percival reads as claiming that no statement is forever undecided.32 He claims that this
second consequence is just obviously false; there exists a p for which ¬Kp ∧ ¬K¬p holds.
We argue that both Percival’s ‘counterexamples’ are valid epistemic principles within
the BHK-based IEL paradigm (see Theorems 8 and 9) and hence do not serve as decisive
arguments against the incorporation of verification-based knowledge into an intuitionistic
framework.33
First, in terms of intuitionistic knowledge (IEL) ¬KA ↔ ¬A claims proving ¬A is
equivalent to proving ¬KA. If we can show that a proof of A reduces to a contradiction
then A cannot possibly hold, hence neither canKA. Conversely, if a proof ofKA reduces to
a contradiction then there cannot be a verification of A, but every proof is also a verification,
hence there cannot be a proof of A.34 The contingency or necessity of ¬A and ¬KA is
not relevant because intuitionistically these are statements about the relationship between
proofs and verifications of propositions – whatever their modal status (cf. [23, p.325]).35
Second, in IEL, ¬(¬KA∧¬K¬A) claims that no truth is unverifiable, not that no truth
remains forever undecided.36 Indeed, by the previous principle if ¬KA held then so does
¬A, i.e. there is a proof of ¬A, hence ¬A is verified and K¬A. Once again, the contingency
of some agent’s ignorance is beside the point.
Percival’s conclusion that since “[verificationist knowability] has consequences that are
plainly unacceptable we do know in advance that no intuitionistic defense . . . with a specific
semantics . . . is going to work” does not stand. The intended intuitionistic semantics,
BHK, as extended to IEL, is such a semantics, and in its terms the consequences are quite
32This is also known as the ‘undecidedness paradox of knowability’ [11], since Percival’s objections are
to the intuitionistic argument against the knowability paradox discussed in section 5.2.
33Or against intuitionistic responses to the knowability paradox.
34See [68].
35Moreover, it is not clear this argument works in its own terms. If ¬A is necessarily true, then A is
necessarily false, in which case A cannot be known, since for a necessarily false A ignorance of A is also
necessary. Hence there is no state of any model where ¬KA does not hold.
36Again see [23], and section 5.1.3.
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acceptable.
6.4 IEL and Non-Mathematical Propositions
But there is a further, more general, premise that Percival assumes which he uses to support
his conclusion, and which seems to apply to any attempt to enunciate an intuitionistic view
of knowledge. He argues that “as anti-realist sympathizers . . . admit, non-mathematical
statements aren’t susceptible to proof and a proof-conditional interpretation of ‘→’ isn’t
generally viable. So an intuitionistic defense [against the ‘paradoxes of intuitionistic knowl-
edge’] can’t appeal to it” [70, p. 183]. According to this line of reasoning an intuitionistic
view of knowledge cannot be put in terms of BHK, because BHK does not apply to all
kinds of propositions. A legitimate intuitionistic defense must give a semantics that holds
for all kinds of propositions, not just mathematical ones, and be “independently plausible”.
We respond that this is an illegitimate constraint on an intuitionistic view of knowledge.
BHK is the intended semantics of intuitionistic logic, indeed the intuitionistic calculus
was constructed to capture the BHK semantics not the other way around. There are,
of course, many non-BHK semantics for IPC, but it is acknowledged that they are more
or less artificial, not true to the intentions of intuitionism, precisely because they do not
represent the BHK view.37 To demand an intuitionistic semantics which rules out BHK is,
to some extent, to demand an intuitionistic theory which is not intuitionistic, which is not
legitimate.
The point of the objection is that the BHK interpretation cannot accommodate non-
mathematical propositions. However this is plainly wrong since there is nothing specifically
mathematical in the BHK description, it makes no mention of numbers, functions, sets,
categories, types, etc. There are a variety of non-mathematical situations in which notions
such as justification, evidence, conclusive evidence make sense; notions which have been
central to epistemology since its inception, and especially so after Gettier [43]. Indeed, the
notions of proof and conclusive evidence are perfectly normal in various non-mathematical
domains, for instance in the context of legal standards establishing guilt or tort.
A number of BHK-style formalisms, e.g. Justification Logic (cf. [2, 3, 8]), have been
developed which study the usual logical propositions along with justification assertions
t is a justification for F.
Indeed, Justification Logic first appeared as the Logic of Proofs which studied formal
mathematical proofs, and was able to fairly represent the mathematical BHK semantics [2].
However, very soon it became clear that the same logical apparatus represents the principles
of justification and evidence at large, which led to general purpose logics of justification
with numerous interpretations far beyond its area of origin, mathematical proofs. It is clear,
37See [2, 19]. “The intended interpretation of intuitionistic logic as presented by Heyting, Kreisel and
others so far has proved to be rather elusive [authors’ note: but see [2]] . . . however, ever since Heyting’s
formalisation, various, more or less artificial, semantics have been proposed” [19, p.22].
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then, that our intuitionistic epistemic framework, and IEL in particular, can model non-
mathematical epistemic situations as well. Moreover, with the built-in notion of verification,
IEL-like systems offer a more expressive logical tool for studying evidence-based knowledge
and beliefs in a general setting than classical epistemic logic. The embedding results in
section 3.3 open the door to formally connecting IEL with justification logics and their
numerous interpretations, both mathematical and non-mathematical.
7 Conclusion
Our primary goal has been to outline an intuitionistic view of belief and knowledge by
articulating their basic principles within the context of the BHK semantics, and to provide
a formal foundation for further studies in intuitionistic epistemology.
We have argued that the co-reflection principle
A→ KA
is foundational for a properly intuitionistic epistemology, valid for any intuitionistic epis-
temic state. Likewise, and for virtually the same reason, the reflection principle KA → A
is so strong intuitionistically that it is invalid.
We have sought to show that the counter-intuitiveness of both claims is merely apparent.
In particular the loss of reflection would seem to rule out our considerations as being
about knowledge at all. We argue that, on the contrary, instead of losing the ability to
reason about knowledge that we have in fact gained a more discriminating perspective,
one which, via the embedding of classical epistemic logic into intuitionistic epistemic logic,
can accommodate all classical epistemic reasoning as well as make distinctions not possible
classically. The prime example being the distinction between reflection and intuitionistic
reflection
KA→ ¬¬A.
On the basis of the BHK semantics we have outlined the basic intuitionistic systems of
belief and knowledge, IEL− and IEL. Of course, we do not mean to rule out extensions of
the systems we outline. Nothing prohibits additions and refinements; this is a beginning
and we hope that this paper will stimulate further research in this area.
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Appendix A Completeness of Intuitionistic Epistemic
Logic
We show that IEL− and IEL are complete with respect to the classes of corresponding models.
The proof is a straightforward extension of the standard completeness proof for IPC. We
will first present a proof for IEL− and then show how to modify it for IEL.
First we define the notion of a prime theory over L.
Definition 5. A set of formulas, Γ, is a theory if it is closed under ⊢ in L. That is, for
any A, if Γ ⊢ A then A ∈ Γ. A set of formulas, Γ, is prime if A∨B ∈ Γ implies that either
A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ.
The following lemma is established by the standard Henkin construction
Lemma 2. For a set of formulas Γ and formula A, if Γ 0 A then there exists a prime
theory ∆, such that Γ ⊆ ∆ and A /∈ ∆.
Theorem 13 (Completeness of L = IEL−, IEL). If a formula A holds in each model of
L, then L ⊢ A.
Proof. We now define the canonical model.
Definition 6. The canonical model is a quadruple 〈W,R,, E〉 such that:
• W is the set of all consistent prime theories;
• ΓR∆ iff Γ ⊆ ∆;
• ΓE∆ iff ΓK ⊆ ∆ where ΓK = {A | KA ∈ Γ};
• Γ  p iff p ∈ Γ, for a propositional letter p.
Lemma 3. The canonical model is a model for L.
Proof. Clearly, ⊆ is a partial order, hence so is R. We need to show that E is a binary
relation meeting the following conditions:
1. E ⊆ R,
2. ΓR∆ ⇒ E(Γ) ⊇ E(∆).
1. Assume ΓE∆ and X ∈ Γ. Since Γ contains L, X → KX ∈ Γ, hence KX ∈ Γ, but
then X ∈ ∆. Since X is arbitrary, Γ ⊆ ∆.
2. Assume ΓR∆EΘ. We have to show that ΓEΘ, i.e. ΓK ⊆ Θ. Take X ∈ ΓK, i.e.
KX ∈ Γ. Since ΓR∆ KX ∈ ∆, hence X ∈ ∆K. Since ∆EΘ holds, ∆K ⊆ Θ, hence
X ∈ Θ.
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In addition, for L = IEL we have to show that E(Γ) 6= ∅ for each Γ ∈ W . Indeed, take
such a Γ. We have to check that there is ∆ ∈ W such that ΓK ⊆ ∆ and for this it suffices
to secure the consistency of ΓK since then, by Lemma 2, a desired ∆ exists. Suppose ΓK
is not consistent. Then for some A1, A2, . . . , An ∈ ΓK
⊢ (A1 ∧ A2 ∧ . . . ∧An)→ ⊥.
By K-necessitation and some modal reasoning,
⊢ (KA1 ∧KA2 ∧ . . . ∧KAn)→ K⊥.
Since IEL ⊢ K⊥ → ⊥,
⊢ (KA1 ∧KA2 ∧ . . . ∧KAn)→ ⊥.
Since KA1,KA2, . . . ,KAn ∈ Γ, Γ is inconsistent - a contradiction.
Lemma 4 (Truth Lemma). For any formula X, Γ  X ⇔ X ∈ Γ.
Proof. By induction on the construction of X . The propositional cases are standard, we
check the epistemic case only, i.e. when X is KY .
⇒: Assume KY ∈ Γ, and ΓE∆, hence Y ∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis ∆  Y .
Since ∆ is arbitrary this holds for any state E-accessible from Γ hence Γ  KY .
⇐: Suppose KY /∈ Γ, in which case ΓK 0 Y . Suppose otherwise (i.e. suppose ΓK ⊢ Y ),
then A1 . . . An ⊢ Y for some Ai ∈ ΓK. By the deduction theorem ⊢ A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An → Y .
Hence ⊢ (KA1 ∧ · · · ∧KAn) → KY . Now KA1 . . .KAn ∈ Γ, hence Γ ⊢ KY . Since Γ is a
theory, KY ∈ Γ, which is a contradiction. Hence ΓK 0 Y . By Lemma 2 there is a prime ∆
such that ΓK ⊆ ∆ and Y /∈ ∆. By the induction hypothesis ∆ 1 Y hence Γ 1 KY .
To finish the proof of Theorem 13, assume L 0 X , which can be read as ∅ 0 X . By
Lemma 2 there is a prime ∆ s.t. X /∈ ∆; such a ∆ is consistent. By the Truth Lemma, in
the canonical model ∆ 1 X , so L 1 X .
Appendix B The Truth Condition on Knowledge
We stated above (section 2.3.3) that ¬K⊥ is the simplest candidate for expressing the truth
condition on knowledge in an intuitionistic manner. In the presence of co-reflection each of
the alternatives to intuitionistic reflection are equivalent (section 3). It is easy to show that
in the absence of co-reflection we get the following hierarchy, from strongest to weakest.
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KA→ A
⇓
¬(KA ∧ ¬A) ⇔ (KA→ ¬¬A) ⇔ ¬¬(KA→ A) ⇔ (¬A→ ¬KA)
⇓
¬K⊥
Figure 5: Heirarchy of Intuitionistic Truth Conditions
These dependencies can be checked in the logic IntK, the intuitionistic analogue of the
classical modal logic K. This is IEL− without co-reflection but with the necessitation rule.
For models of IntK, see [9, 42].
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